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FESTO AND THE COMPLETE BAR: WHAT’S LEFT OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS? 
JACOB S. WHARTON, ESQ.* 
“Momma’s don’t let your babies grow up to be cowboys, 
Make them be doctors and lawyers and such”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It can be said that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.2 is steeped more in the traits of cowboys than 
lawyers.  That is, the decision makes an impact on the entire range, the range 
of coverage that is, not the high prairie.  The en banc decision has an instant 
and profound impact on the interpretation of every issued unexpired U.S. 
patent,3 those being licensed and every pending patent application. The rule 
from Festo helps determine the scope of an issued patent, but the decision is 
notable as it creates a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents to practically every claim that has been amended during the 
prosecution of the patent application. 
Note that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this 
case.4  The briefs seeking and opposing certiorari vigorously debate the policy 
underpinnings of the decision.5  The high Court’s decision is eagerly awaited 
 
*Mr. Wharton is an associate at Senniger, Powers, Leavitt & Roedel, St. Louis, Missouri.  His 
practice focuses on litigation, counseling and patent prosecution primarily in the biotechnological 
arts.  He can be contacted at (314) 231-5400 or at jwharton@senniger.com. 
 1. WILLIE NELSON, Momma Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Cowboys, on THE BEST 
OF WILLIE NELSON (Heartland Music 1986). 
 2. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 9, 2001) (No. 
01-1543).  Among others, amicus briefs have been filed by the Association of Patent Law Firms, 
Federal Circuit Bar, Federation International des Counseils en Propriete Industrielle and the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association. 
 3. There are approximately 1.2 million patents now in force prosecuted prior to the Festo 
decision.  See Reply to Brief in Opposition at 3, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 69 U.S.L.W. 3673 (U.S. June 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.hoffmanbaron.com/news/. 
 4. 69 U.S.L.W. 3673 (U.S. June 18, 2001). 
 5. See Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 4 (“The holders of . . . patents 
[prosecuted prior to the Festo decision] are now rendered defenseless against imitators who have 
made insignificant changes to amended claim elements.”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space 
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by intellectual property community: attorneys, patentees, licensors and 
licensees alike.  But in the interim, the complete bar rule is the law of the land 
and may ultimately be the prevailing law.  Thus, a through analysis of the 
decision is warranted. 
The practical effect of the complete bar is that the drafter of an application 
must take added precautions prior to filing the original application.  
Commentators were quick to point out the myriad of red flags that Festo 
raises.6  Though the decision certainly gives cause to change the approach 
taken to drafting the original application,7 it should be noted that the 
practitioner sometimes cannot possibly attend to every detail to their liking 
before filing an application.8  Indeed, the nature of drafting a patent application 
does not often lend itself to an ordered and scheduled process as an inventor 
may disclose material in an erudite and oft in an ill-timed manner.  The 
author’s intent is to review the Festo decision and apply the practical lessons 
from the viewpoint of the practitioner. 
The Festo decision tackles the multi-faceted doctrine of equivalents; 
beginning with its history via Supreme Court precedent and continuing through 
Federal Circuit precedent. The majority then proceeds to blaze a well-marked 
trail, be it for good or bad, along one simple and straight path.  As background, 
note that the doctrine of equivalents prevents an accused infringer from 
avoiding liability for infringement by changing only minor or insubstantial 
details of a claimed invention while retaining the invention’s essential 
identity.9  Infringement will be found under the doctrine of equivalents if the 
difference between the claimed and accused device or composition are 
insubstantial.10 
Substantiality is measured objectively from the viewpoint of one skilled in 
the art and is often measured by the function-way-result test.11  Infringement 
exists under this test if the accused product performs substantially the same 
function in substantially the same way to produce substantially the same 
result.12  The doctrine must balance the policy goals of ensuring that the 
 
Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying complete bar to patent that 
issued in 1978). 
 6. W.D. Wallace, Life After Festo: Guarding Against Copyists, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, 
January 2001, at 8-11. 
 7. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1326. 
 8. Gerry Gressel, Claim Drafting and Claim Amendment to Reduce the Festo Effect, 
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, April 2001, at 24-25. 
 9. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608  (1950). 
 10. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson, Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. 
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patentee enjoy the full benefit of his patent and ensuring that the claims give 
“fair notice” of the patent’s scope.13 
To prevent the doctrine of equivalents from consuming the public notice 
goal, prosecution history estoppel is used by the court.14  The doctrine operates 
by preventing a patentee from claiming subject matter relinquished during 
prosecution of a patent application.  Estoppel occurs where the patentee has 
taken certain actions before the Patent Office, including amendments to the 
claims.15  Therefore, “the doctrine of equivalents is subservient to . . . 
prosecution history estoppel.”16  The general idea behind prosecution history 
estoppel is that the patentee, by actions taken during prosecution, puts the 
public on notice of the rights claimed and the rights surrendered.  Actions, such 
as amendments made to claims, adding more specific elements in order to 
overcome novelty17 or obviousness18 rejections based upon prior art cited by 
the primary examiner, are the type of action that gives rise to prosecution 
history estoppel. 
The Supreme Court has noted that “the doctrine of equivalents, as it has 
come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own.”19  To 
stem this life, the decision in Warner-Jenkinson stated that courts will have to 
“decide whether the proffered reason [for an action made during prosecution] 
is sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of 
the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by the amendment.”20  The 
Court also stated that “where no explanation is established, . . . the court 
should presume that the patent applicant had a substantial reason related to 
patentability for including the limiting element added by the amendment.”21  
Therefore, “prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents as to that element.”22 
Despite being urged by the Warner-Jenkinson court, the Federal Circuit 
refused “to require judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing 
application of the doctrine of equivalents,”23 refused to require “proof of 
intent” on the part of the alleged infringer before the doctrine of equivalents 
 
 13. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 14. See, e.g., Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036  (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 15. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 16. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 17. See 35 U.S.C. §102 (1999). 
 18. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1999). 
 19. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997). 
 20. Id. at 33. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 34. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
284 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:281 
could be applied,24 and refused to adopt “independent experimentation” as “an 
equitable defense to the doctrine of equivalents.”25  The court stated that the 
“proper time for evaluating equivalency . . . is at the time of infringement, not 
at the time the patent was issued.”26  However, even though prosecution 
history estoppel may apply, the court stated that “if the patent holder 
demonstrates that an amendment required during prosecution had a purpose 
unrelated to patentability,27 a court must consider that purpose in order to 
decide whether an estoppel is precluded.”28  In the event that “the patent holder 
is unable to establish such a purpose, a court should presume that the purpose 
behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel would 
apply.”29 
Prior to Festo the Federal Circuit applied the “flexible bar” approach.30  
The flexible bar stated that prosecution history estoppel “may have a limited 
effect” on the doctrine of equivalents “within a spectrum ranging from great to 
small to zero.”31  Under the “flexible bar” the court came down differently, 
flexing both ways so to say, both in support of an equitable case-by-case 
approach32 and in support of a more-complete bar.33  The divergence in 
approach certainly caused confusion as to the potential scope of equivalents 
 
 24. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 35-36. 
 25. Id. at 36. 
 26. Id. at 37. 
 27. An amendment to correct a typographical error would clearly fall into this category. 
 28. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40-41. 
 29. Id. at 41. 
 30. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 31. Id. at 1363. 
 32. See, e.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (vacating finding of non-infringement based on the  holding that once a claim element 
is amended, no equivalent is available); see also Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 
588 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that prosecution history estoppel should not cause “a total preclusion 
of equivalence”); Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555-56 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (vacating finding of non-infringement under doctrine of equivalents due to 
prosecution history estoppel because, although “the available range of equivalency is limited, by 
estoppel, . . . the prosecution history and the prior art do not eliminate equivalents.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  See also 5A 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[b], at 18-492 (1998): 
“Beginning shortly after its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit developed two lines of 
authority on the scope of an estoppel based on an amendment or argument that 
distinguished the prior art.  One line followed a strict approach, according to which a 
court refused to speculate whether a narrower amendment would have been allowed.  The 
other line followed a flexible or spectrum approach, which recognized that amendments 
did not invariably preclude all equivalents . . . .” 
Id. 
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available.34  After the Warner-Jenkinson decision, the Federal Circuit revisited 
the issue, the decisions thereafter reflect the concept that the court still decides 
what subject matter a patentee has surrendered during prosecution to determine 
the range of available equivalents.35 
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson, stated that any amendment made for “a 
substantial reason related to patentability” creates prosecution history estoppel.  
The decision, albeit far reaching in nature, still left many questions 
unanswered.  Thus, with the Hughes “flexible bar” appearing inoperable, or at 
least irreconcilable with the other Federal Circuit’s cases implementing a bar, 
the Federal Circuit was then poised to resolve the ambiguities left by these 
cases. 
II.  QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR EN BANC REVIEW 
The Festo court requested briefs on five questions for rehearing en banc.  
These five issues comprise the background on which the court constructs a 
lengthy opinion, including a number of concurring and dissenting opinions.  
For brevity’s sake, the majority opinion is the focus of this work.  The 
questions presented were:36 
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim 
creates prosecution history estoppel, is “a substantial reason related to 
patentability,”37 limited to those amendments made to overcome prior 
art under § 102 and § 103, or does “patentability” mean any reason 
affecting the issuance of a patent? 
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a “voluntary” claim amendment - one 
not required by the examiner or made in response to a rejection by an 
examiner for a stated reason - create prosecution history estoppel? 
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under 
Warner-Jenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available under 
the doctrine of equivalents for the claim so amended? 
4. When “no explanation for a claim amendment is established,”38 thus 
invoking the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under 
 
 34. See Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Area Summary, Patent Law Developments in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 887-
88 (1987). 
 35. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  See 
also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the court determines the exact subject matter the patentee actually surrendered and if the accused 
devise does not fall within the range of material surrendered, the doctrine of equivalents is not 
barred). 
 36. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 1381-82 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 37. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 33. 
 38. Id. 
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Warner-Jenkinson, what range of equivalent, if any, is available under 
the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so amended? 
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate Warner-
Jenkinson’s requirement that the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents “is not allowed such broad play as to eliminate an element 
in its entirety.”39  In other words, would such a judgment of 
infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson, violate the “all element” rule? 
III.  MAJORITY OPINION- THE “COMPLETE BAR” 
The court answered the first question by stating that: 
[f]or the purposes of determining whether an amendment gives rise to 
prosecution history estoppel, a ‘substantial reason related to patentability’ is 
not limited to overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any reason 
which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent.  Therefore, a 
narrowing amendment made for any reason related to the statutory 
requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with 
respect to the amended claim element.40 
The Court, in Warner-Jenkinson, only addressed amendments made to 
overcome objections based on prior art.41  The Festo court recognized a litany 
of statutory requirements that must be satisfied before a valid patent can issue 
and that are thus related to patentability.  The list now includes patentability 
requirements found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,42 102,43 103,44 and 112.45  The court 
stated that they “see no reason why prosecution history estoppel should not 
also arise from amendments made for other reasons related to 
patentability . . . .”46  The response to question one is based on Warner-
Jenkinson’s statement that an amendment “does not necessarily preclude 
infringement by equivalents of that element.”47  Thus, “if a patent holder can 
 
 39. Id. at 29. 
 40. Festo, 234 F.3d  at  556. 
 41. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-34. 
 42. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (discussing the patentable subject matter requirement). 
 43. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding a patent 
invalid because the claims were anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102). 
 44. See Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 190 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding a 
patent invalid because the claims were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
 45. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding a 
patent invalid because the claims were not enabled, as required by 35 U.S.C.§ 112); Johnson 
Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (considering whether a 
patent claim was invalid under the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph 
1.) 
 46. Festo, 234 F.3d at 567. 
 47. Id. at 567 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 
(1997)). 
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show from the prosecution history that a claim amendment was not motivated 
by patentability concerns, the amendment will not give rise to prosecution 
history estoppel.”48 
The Court answered question two as follows: 
Both voluntary amendments and amendments required by the Patent Office 
signal to the public that subject matter has been surrendered.  There is no 
reason why prosecution history estoppel should arise if the Patent Office 
rejects a claim because it believes the claim to be unpatentable, but not if the 
applicant amends a claim because he believes the claim to be unpatentable.49 
The court then cites a number of cases where the applicant clearly 
surrendered subject matter during prosecution.50  The court again based their 
rule on the lack of opposing precedent and stated that “[t]here is no reason why 
an amendment-based surrender of subject matter should be given less force 
than an argument-based surrender of subject matter.”51 
The heart of the Festo opinion lies in the answer to question three.  In 
response, the court stated: 
When a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a 
claim element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim 
element.  Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is 
completely barred (a “complete bar”).52 
Based on the assumption that the issue of whether a range of equivalents is 
still available to an amended claim had not been addressed,53 the court 
proceeded to independently decide the issue.54  Based upon their distinguishing 
directive, that is, Congress specifically created the Federal Circuit to resolve 
 
 48. Festo, 234 F.3d at 567-68. 
 49. Id. at 568. 
 50. See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that “KCJ’s statements during prosecution reflect a clear and unmistakable 
surrender” of subject matter that cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents); Bayer 
AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that 
“through Bayer’s statements to the PTO and the declarations if filed, Bayer made statements of 
clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter” which it cannot recapture through the 
doctrine of equivalents); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583, (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“Clear assertions made during prosecution in support of patentability, whether or not 
actually required to secure allowance of the claim may . . . create an estoppel.”); Texas 
Instruments Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(holding that arguments made during prosecution that emphasized one feature of the invention 
estopped the patent holder from asserting that a device lacking that feature infringed the patent 
under the doctrine of equivalents). 
 51. Festo, 234 F.3d at 568. 
 52. Id. at 569. 
 53. Id. at 569-71. 
 54. Id. at 571. 
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issues unique to patent law,55 the court found the issue of prosecution history 
estoppel, a judicially created doctrine,56 forthrightly in their jurisdiction.57 
The court, maintaining the complete bar for policy reasons, extrapolated 
that if the doctrine of equivalents is applied broadly, the definitional and 
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement are not met.58  If, 
however, a complete bar is in place, the public is on notice as to what scope of 
protection the claims, narrowed for reasons related to patentability, provide.  
The patentee and the public can look to the prosecution file history, a public 
record once a patent issues, to determine if any prosecution history estoppel 
arises as to any elements of the claims.59  The complete bar also eliminates the 
possible guessing that could go on as to the scope of equivalents available after 
a narrowing amendment related to patentability.60  In this discussion, the court 
weighs public notice versus patentee rights; and public notice certainly finds 
favor with the en banc panel. 
The court lamented that the flexible bar lacked a yardstick by which to 
measure the range of equivalents when prosecution history estoppel applies.61  
The outer limit of such equivalents is clearly marked by the prior art, but the 
area of design between is a “zone of uncertainty” that can hamper commercial 
development.62  The court offers an example of a claim that originally reads 
“less than twenty” that is amended to read “less than five” in light of a 
rejection over prior art that recites “less than fifteen.”63  The range between the 
prior art and the amended claim available for patenting and commercialization 
is ambiguous.64  The complete bar allows the public, and the patentee, to know 
that an amended claim is limited to a literal interpretation of the claim 
elements.  The court then commented that “[a]lthough the flexible bar affords 
the patentee more protection under the doctrine of equivalents, we do not 
believe that the benefits outweigh the costs of uncertainty.”65  Concluding, the 
court stated that the “application of a complete bar to the doctrine of 
equivalents whenever a claim amendment gives rise to prosecution history 
estoppel similarly reduces the conflict and tension between the patent 
 
 55. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981)). 
 56. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 57. Festo, 234 F.3d at 571-72.  Note that the position taken by the Federal Circuit leaves 
their decision ripe for Supreme Court review. 
 58. Id. at 576. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 577. 
 62. Festo, 234 F.3d at 577. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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protection afforded by the doctrine of equivalents and the public’s ability to 
ascertain the scope of the patent.”66 
As to question four, the court answered that “[w]hen no explanation for a 
claim amendment is established, no range of equivalents is available for the 
claim element so amended.”67  Citing to Warner-Jenkinson, the court stated 
“where no explanation is established, . . . prosecution history estoppel would 
bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.”68 
As to question five, the court found no need to reach a decision on this 
question based on the application of the complete bar to the patents at issue in 
the Festo case.  They did, however, leave this question for another day.69 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The answers presented above basically create a two-prong test: (1) does the 
amendment narrow the claims; and (2) was the amendment related to 
patentability.  This test pertains to the majority of all amendments made during 
prosecution.  The patentee is now faced with two formidable hurdles to 
overcome to secure a finding of infringement.  Most amendments, even if 
made for clarification, perhaps in response to a § 112 rejection, will be in 
response to a statutory rejection. The rule, therefore, may be overreaching in 
nature.  Even though a straight-forward, easy-to-apply rule has its obvious 
advantages, the untoward side of such a doctrine is revealed in its application. 
A competitor may easily avoid a patent under the new rules.  The 
competitor simply orders a copy of the prosecution history and reviews the 
amendments made during prosecution.  If the amendments were made for 
reasons of patentability or the reason cannot be ascertained from the 
prosecution history, the competitor is free to operate within what could have 
traditionally been included in the range of equivalents. 
The court notes that the field of biotechnology is one critical field that may 
be harmed by the majority’s rule.70  Completely barring the patent holder from 
turning to the doctrine of equivalents for amended claim limitations may 
severely limit the scope of biotechnology patents.  For example, a protein 
molecule can only be claimed as the complete and specific sequence of amino 
acids comprising the protein.71  The nature of protein chains are such that the 
amino acids that comprise the protein are interchangeable without changing the 
functionality, and therefore typically the commercial limitation, of the protein. 
 
 66. Id. at 578. 
 67. Festo, 234 F.3d at 578 
 68. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 616 (J. Michel, concurring in part). 
 71. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.821 (2000) 
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The impact of this basic rule of biology may seem unassuming.  However, 
as the Federal Circuit has noted, in a single patent claiming the protein 
erythropoietin, “over 3,600 different protein analogs can be made by 
substituting interchangeable acids at only a single amino acid position, and 
over a million different analogs can be made by substituting three amino 
acids.”72  Because a substituted homology may retain the desired functionality 
of the claimed sequence, a competitor seeking to make, use or sell a protein 
that is claimed in an issued patent with an amended claim simply has to design 
around the patented sequence.  Such design around can be accomplished by 
simply finding unclaimed substitutions producing proteins functionally 
equivalent to the claimed protein.73 
When drafting a patent, in particular claims directed towards a protein, it 
would appear the practitioner would have to meticulously and individually 
disclose and claim each and every functionally equivalent homolog.  Initially 
drafting clear broad claims will reduce the possibilities of the need for an 
amendment and, therefore, the impact Festo may have on the claim. 
After Festo, claims need to be drafted in a manner that distinctly delineates 
the elements contained therein.  A patent attorney drafting an application at 
this time should pay close attention while drafting claims with ranges and 
excessively long claims.74  Chemical patents are particularly likely to have a 
range appear in a claim.  A range, however, can show up in patents covering 
all specimens of subject matter. Claim ranges should be split to include clearly 
identified limits, as opposed to the traditional “between x and y.”  To avoid 
losing any range of equivalents due to an amendment, it would be better to set 
out the ranges separately.  A claim that splits the range into two discrete 
elements allows for one end of the range to be amended if necessary without 
potentially ambiguous amendments being made to the entire claim. 
Run-on claims are claims consisting of long run-on sentences that describe 
the composition and perhaps function of a composition.  Such claims are best 
broken down into individual elements as Festo impacts claim elements, not the 
claims in their entirety.  Claims broken down into distinct elements can be 
carefully amended to overcome prior art or any other statutory reason for 
rejection with less risk of losing the range of equivalents available to the non-
amended elements.  In either situation, with ranges or lengthy descriptions, the 
 
 72. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 73. For a response to this biotechnology hypothetical, see Festo, 234 F.3d at 597-98: 
“I believe that the concern is largely theoretical.  The first inventors to enter a field are 
only entitled to claim what they can describe and enable, and I am confident that 
competent patent attorneys can readily craft their claims to cover that subject matter so 
that estoppel can be avoided.  Moreover, subsequent inventors will be better able to find 
and develop improved products without fear of lawsuits.  Predictability will be enhanced.” 
Id. (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 74. For an excellent discussion on drafting tips, see Gressel, supra note 5. 
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key is set out each and every element of a claim in distinct and recognizable 
units. 
One criticism of the ruling is that the complete bar applies to all unexpired 
issued patents.  Past drafting efforts, made prior to the decision but with 
painstaking care, may contain many pitfalls that the patent attorney can do 
little about today.  The decision, therefore, necessitates a review of the 
prosecution history of all commercially important issued and valid patents to 
determine if an addition filing or reissue is necessary, possible or desired.  
Although the commercially important elements of a claim may stay intact 
under a Festo review, the scope of available licenses and the value of existing 
licenses may be severely emoted. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The court did not have to adopt the complete bar, workable alternatives do 
exist.  As Judge Plager said of the majority view, “[i]t is a second-best solution 
to an unsatisfactory situation.”75  Judge Plager advocates that the doctrine of 
equivalents, a judge made rule in the first place, ought to be applied in equity, 
on a case-by-case basis.  The equitable application of the doctrine is certainly 
appealing.  For the patentee, this would leave the door open to argue the 
intended and resultant effect of an amendment does not unnecessarily limit the 
scope of equivalents to which a claim is privileged.  The author suggests a 
rebuttable presumption rule may operate more equitably.  When an amendment 
with respect to patentability is made, a rebuttable presumption that a complete 
bar to equivalents would then arise.  The patentee could then show that the 
amendments were not made to overcome prior art but for reasons such as 
clarity.  The common law and district courts can certainly handle such a rule.76  
However, others welcome the rule.  The rule facilitates the interpretation of 
issued patents operating as prior art, thereby facilitating patentability and 
freedom to operate searches.  The rule also allows competitors to design 
around issued patents once the prosecution history has been reviewed.  These 
points, of course, cut both ways.  The rule will operate to severely impair the 
rights of the patentee and the decision has removed a prodigious degree of 
equity from patent litigation.  So to answer the question presented in the title, 
what is left of the doctrine of equivalents, is clearly, “not much.”  In the 
interim, remember, unless an patentee can squarely demonstrate an amendment 
(1) does not narrow the scope of the claims and (2) was not made for 
patentability, there will be a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
 
 75. Festo, 234 F.3d 591. 
 76. See Control Resources, Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp.2d 121, 123-125 (D. Mass. 
2001) (criticizing the Federal Circuit in Festo for usurping the common law function of the 
district courts). 
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